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Abstract
The article analyses a French seminal legal award which served as a stepping stone in the recent French 
debate concerning the legislation banning women from wearing the Burqa headscarf in public. Under 
this wording—Burqa—a special style of the hijab—a scarf donned by Muslim women—is being targeted. 
It represents a more extreme form of covering: The Burqa is worn by the Pashtun women of Pakistan and 
in Afghanistan and covers the body from head to toes in a continuous piece of fabric, whereas the veil 
banned in France also includes the niqab which may or may not cover the entire body, and allows visibil-
ity of the eyes but not the entire face. In the relevant debate, gender equality has been the banner hoisted 
by court and parliamentarians purporting to protect women against the unsettling impact of the Burqa. 
This article represents a critical study of this claim. The article describes and analyses the ambivalent tenor 
of the Burqa Decision and arrives at two main conclusions. First, having distinguished two key values 
addressed (directly and indirectly) by the Conseil d’État—equality and freedom—the article concludes 
that although hailed as defying gender discrimination, the judgment must also be construed as contribut-
ing to inequality among women. The award remains just as unclear in regards to the protection of free-
dom of religious expression suggesting that women equality oﬀers only one among other explanations for 
this ruling. Second, the article’s analysis applies several feminist approaches to the Burqa Decision and 
ﬁnds that the pluralist feminist discourse results in diﬀerent and inconsistent potential resolutions to the 
case. The upshot is that the Burqa Decision, which was taken as a strong condemnation of a practise said 
to be symbolising the subjugation of the female to male domination, was conﬁrming a view espoused 
largely by Western secular women. In doing so, and given the approval by France’s mainstream society, 
the award appears to have empowered this particular segment in the female population. At the same time 
however, the tribunal also stated the obvious namely, that gender equality has been serving as a powerful 
tool in the adjudicative struggle between secularism and religion. While women’s struggle for gender 
equality, especially in politics and the economy, has been protracted and not yet fully achieved, the com-
paratively brief and hurried commitment to gender equality at the intersection of religion and secularism, 
suggest that gender equality was not the only priority on the adjudicator’s mind, hence is not necessarily 
the ultimate winner of this award. 
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I. Introduction
“The principle of the equality of the sexes is not negotiable,” declared Valérie 
Pécresse,1 France’s Minister of Higher Education, following the Conseil d’État’s 
decision (Burqa Decision).2 The appellate court declined a Moroccan woman’s 
request for French naturalization on the grounds of “incompatibility with the 
essential values of the French community”.3 Pécresse’s sentiment was echoed by 
both right and left wing quarters in France.4 It represented one link in a longer 
chain of developments which would a year later, in 2009, see a special parliamen-
tary commission formed by President Nicolas Sarkozy, tasked with the study of 
the compatibility of the Muslim Burqa (female headscarf ) with French secular 
culture and constitutional principle of laïcité separating State and Church.5 The 
principle –a three-prong idea– corresponds with the law of 9 December 1905, on 
the separation of Church and State and guarantees the freedom of conscience and 
the free exercise of faith subject only to the restrictions necessary to safeguard the 
public order and the neutrality of the Republic, which itself is devoid of any 
faith.6 While coined in a law, laïcité is ﬁrst and foremost an idea, and only second-
arily a legal concept; it conﬁrms the division between the private realm wherein 
the individual person is free in the pursuit of spiritual and religious choice, on the 
one hand, and the state, which is neutral, assiduously refrains from any interfer-
ence in such matters, on the other hand. Accordingly, the rights of the believer 
and of the agnostic or atheist are equally secured. This concept constitutes an 
essential element of the French social contract.7 
1 ‘Port (Bearing) of the burqa: Pécresse approves the refusal of nationality’, nouvelobs.com, 13 July 
2008, <nouvelobs.com>, 3 April 2009.
2 Décisions du Conseil d’État, Séance du 26 mai 2008, Lecture du 27 juin 2008, No 2B679B, <http://
www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/fr/base-de-jurisprudence/>, 25 April 2009. 
3 ‘Port (Bearing) of the Burqa’, supra note 1. The French values referred to in the tribunal’s decision 
note speciﬁcally essential values of the French community which in the case in point are the principles of 
gender equality (“valeurs essentielles de la communauté francaise, et notamment avec le principe d’égalité 
des sexes;” Conseil d’État, 2008). Throughout the article, ‘French values’ are understood to represent the 
values enshrined in the French civil culture notably in the August 1789 revolutionary Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen which aﬃrms, among others, the right to freedom of religion. This aspect of 
secularism was further developed, culminating in the coining of the term laïcité in 1905, during the 3rd 
Republic, in the law separating Church and State, and has been recognised as a French value.
4 Anciberro, Jérôme, ‘Pratique radical au Conseil d’État, Témoignage chrétien 2006, 1 July 2008, 
<http://www.temoignagechretien.fr>, 2 May 2009.
5 ‘Le port du voile intégral bouscule la tradition laïque française’, Le Monde, 22 June 2009.
6 Éric M. Raoult, Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du Règlement au nom de la 
mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire national, 2010. Paris, Assem-
blée Nationale, no. 2262, 26 January 2010, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/rap-info/i2262
.pdf., 30 March 2011.
7 Ibid.
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The 2010 report of the commission (Burqa Report)8 was adopted by the lower 
house9 in July 2010 in a vote of 335 in favour, 1 against,10 and in September 2010 
by the upper house in a 246 to 1 vote.11 In October 2010, the law, which stipu-
lates ﬁnes of EUR 150 for women who breach it, and EUR 30,000 and a one-
year prison term for men who force their wives to wear the burqa, was proclaimed 
legal by France’s constitutional watchdog, the Conseil constitutionnel.12 The rule’s 
legality is expected to be challenged before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), the decision of which is binding.13 
At this background, the article sets out to examine the Burqa Decision, which 
represents a judicial stepping stone in the progression from the legislative act of 
2004,14 forbidding the manifestation of religious symbols in public education 
institutions, and the 2010 legislation of the Burqa law. It is reasonable to expect 
that many of the issues discussed in this article will arise in the legal challenges to 
the new law.
The Burqa Decision was taken as a strong condemnation of a practise said to 
be symbolising the subjugation of the female to male domination. It was thus 
initially celebrated as a crucial act of empowerment for women in France but has 
also resonated across a Europe troubled by cultural and religious tensions associ-
ated with the steady growth in the Muslim population since World War II. The 
Burqa Report15 addresses the issue of the Muslim veil as debated in Europe, not-
ing similar parliamentary debates in Belgium,16 The Netherlands,17 and Spain.18 
 8 Ibid.
 9 Projet de Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public. Assemblée Nationale, no. 
2520, 19 May 2010, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/projets/pl2520.asp>, 1 April 2011.
10 ‘Loi sur la burqa: vers un débat moins passionné’, Nouvel Observateur, 6 July 2010, <http://
tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/index.html>, 14 September 2010.
11 ‘French Senate Votes to ban Islamic Full Veil in Public’, BBC News Europe, 14 September 2010, 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11305033>, 1 April 2011.
12 Décision n° 2010–613 DC (Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public), Le 
Conseil constitutionnel, 7 octobre 2010, <http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/
francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2010/2010–613-dc/decision-n-2010-
613-dc-du-07-octobre-2010.49711.html>, 1 April 2011.
13 ‘French Senate Votes . . .’, supra note 11.
14 Loi n° 2004–228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes 
ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. Paris: 
(1) NOR: MENX0400001L, Version consolidée au 01 septembre 2004, <http://legifrance.gouv.fr/
aﬃchTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977>, 29 April 2009.
15 Raoult, supra note 6.
16 On 29 April 2010, Belgium’s lower house of parliament approved a ban on Islamic face-covering veils 
with an overwhelming majority. ‘Divided Country Finds Consensus on Islamic Veils’, 04/30/2010.
17 In return for Geert Wilders Freedom Party’s parliamentary support, two centre-right parties hoping 
to establish a minority government, agreed on 30 September 2010 to ban the burqa in the Netherlands. 
Reuters news, 30 September 2010.
18 On 23 June 2010, the Spanish Senate approved a motion to ban the burqa and the Parliamentary 
Assembly called on the Council of Europe to outlaw “any usage, custom or discriminatory practice that 
limits the freedom of women”. SpiegelOnline 06/24/2010.
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The issue features also in debates outside Europe, for instance, in Canada,19 
Turkey,20 Egypt,21 and Syria (which recently promulgated a law prohibiting stu-
dents and teachers from wearing the niqab).22 
The article dissects the judicial award in order to ascertain the validity of the 
claim concerning the empowerment of French women and women in general. 
It ﬁnds that although guided by the well-intentioned imperative of ‘protecting’ 
women, the tribunal misjudged the values at play thus producing consequences 
that outweigh the original intention of securing gender equality. The article fur-
ther suggests that despite the strong assertions to the contrary by various actors—
both ‘feminists’ and others—gender equality represented only one part of the 
broader goal the Burqa Decision sought to address. That article submits that 
the goal—of weakening the tension between immigrants and people of French 
stock, and integrating immigrants within the French culture of laïcité—would be 
more adequately decided in the French public debate and by the legislature rather 
than in the courtroom. Indeed, that is where it has subsequently been played out. 
However, even there the Woman has been featuring as the linchpin symbolizing 
the ‘other’, in an endeavour to explicitly articulate the French collective identity. 
The article opens with a description of the Burqa Decision. This is followed by 
an analysis of the decision, focusing on the values and human rights principles 
raised therein. Next, the award is scrutinized against the socio-political, adjudica-
tive, and legislative contexts wherein gender relations have been pivotal. This 
examination will show that what appears as a prima facie gender equality judg-
ment may concurrently operate as an emasculating ruling.23
19 In Canada, the issue of the Muslim veil has ﬁgured as one among several issues concerning freedom 
of religion—the Sikh ceremonial dagger known as the kirpan, and polygamy in a special Christian fun-
damentalist sect in Bountiful, British Columbia—which have been referred to court adjudication rather 
than attracted parliamentary debate. The Globe & Mail, 18 March 2011. Cf. note 14 supra for the Shari’a 
debate in Canada.
20 The famous European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Sahin case exempliﬁes the complexity of 
the issue in the context of the Turkish polity and society. 
21 Over the past several years, the wearing of the niqab, especially in schools, has been hotly and widely 
debated in Egypt, reaching also the Egyptian courts to determine whether to uphold the Education Min-
istry’s ban over the niqab. Edward Yeranian, ‘Veil Ban: Why Syria Joins Europe in Barring the Niqab’, 
Christian Science Monitor, 20 July 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0720/
Veil-ban-Why-Syria-joins-Europe-in-barring-the-niqab>, retrieved 30 March 2011.
22 In an attempt to preserve its traditional role as the ‘Middle East’s bastion of secularism’, Syria 
joined the trend in some European countries in banning the niqab on 18 July 2011. The Christian 
Science Monitor, 20 July 2010. See also Albert Aji, Elizabeth A. Kennedy, ‘Syria Bans Full Islamic Face 
Veils at Universities’,  Associated Press, 19 July 2010, <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2555452/
posts>, 1 April 2011.
23 See Kennedy for a framework exposé of several issues addressed in my article including human rights 
and gender equality, choice and submission, the role of the court, cost and beneﬁts of the gender equality 
case, power distributions, the Western idea and realities of equality and freedom (or emancipation), etc. 
David Kennedy, ‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’, 6 European Human 
Rights Law Review (2001), p. 245.
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II. What is the Burqa Decision?
In 2005, the French administrative immigration tribunal rendered a decree 
declining Mrs. Faiza M. (M) French citizenship on the ground of “failure to 
assimilate”.24 That year, M ﬁled an appeal challenging the denial of naturalization. 
In 2008, the Conseil d’État upheld the original award based on Articles 21–2 and 
21–4 of the French Code Civil. Article 21–2 stipulates that a foreigner marrying 
a French national may after two years of uninterrupted marriage acquire French 
citizenship by declaration provided the French spouse maintains French citizen-
ship.25 Article 21–4 authorises the French Government to oppose the declaration 
should the Conseil d’État ﬁnd and decree a “failure of assimilation other than 
linguistic”26 on the part of the foreign spouse. In M’s case, the tribunal noted that 
although mastering the French language, M had nevertheless “adopted a radical 
religious practice, incompatible with the essential values of the French commu-
nity, notably the principle of gender equality”.27 This was considered suﬃcient 
justiﬁcation to deny her citizenship. The emphases in the tribunal’s decree are 
worth noting. Accordingly, the original decree of 2005 had neither the object nor 
the eﬀect of undermining the freedom of religion of M and consequently, did not 
infringe either the French constitutional principle of freedom of religious expres-
sion nor Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).28 
The media’s attention was drawn to the case both by the tribunal’s words as 
well as its silence. Speciﬁcally the wording—“radical religious practice”29—was 
as important as the tribunal laconic notation of “radical”.30 This left ample room 
for speculation to ﬁll in the missing details obtained from interviews with 
government oﬃcials. Consequently, most media reports suggested that M was 
in the habit of wearing a Burqa31 covering her entire body and face, a detail of 
24 Conseil d’État 2008, supra note 2.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. (author’s translation).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.; Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
[Rome 4.XI.1950] as amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, Registry of the 
European Court of Human Rights September 2003, <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-
dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf>, 16 September 2010.
29 Conseil d’État 2008, supra note 2.
30 Ibid., (author’s translation).
31 “Covered by the garment of women in the Arab peninsula, a long gown up to the feet, a veil hiding 
the hair, the front and the coat all in one piece of fabric hiding the face.” Ségolène de Larquier, ‘Elle porte 
la burqa, la nationalité française lui est refusé’, Le Point, 17 July2008, <Le Point.fr>, 29 April 2009. This 
was refuted by an NGO reporting to have interviewed M after the award was handed down, and specify-
ing she used to wear a niqab (a head and face cover leaving the eyes visible). Bernard Fischer, ‘Arrêt du 
Conseil d’Etat concernant le refus d’octroi de la nationalité : Entretien du CCIF avec les membres de la 
famille’, Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France, Agence de presse L’accueil, 23 Juillet 2008, <http://
www.islamophobie.net/>, 29 April 2009. 
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great significance especially ever since the promulgation of the 2004 law prohibit-
ing the wearing of any religious insignia of any religion in public education 
 institutions.32 
No less important was the tribunal’s juxtaposition of the said radical religious 
practice with the French “principle of equality of the sexes”.33 Similar to the first 
part of the award, the tribunal remained lip-sealed also here. And again, it was the 
media which provided the details. M was identified as a thirty-two year old 
mother of three children. Described as a person who prior to her landing in 
France (from Morocco) was not in the habit of wearing a burqa but once in 
France, and along with her husband, subscribed to Salafism thus professing a lit-
eral interpretation of the Koran. M was portrayed as completely submissive to the 
men in her family, a condition she appeared to find normal; was reclusive and 
isolated from French society, and ignorant of secularism and her right to vote.34 
Known as the “Burqa case”, the decision was hailed across France as a victory 
to feminists—both native French and immigrants. Fadela Amara, then French 
Secretary of State for Urban Policies and former president of the organisation Ni 
Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores Nor Doormats), welcomed the decree. To 
her—a long time feminist activist—the Islamic veil (regardless of style) symbol-
ised women’s oppression by men, not a true believer’s religious practice, and M—a 
victim of that oppression.35 This opinion was shared also by France’s Minister of 
Higher Education and Research since 2007, Valerie Pécresse.36 
III. Essence of the Burqa Decision 
The plain words of the decision reveal more than the eye meets, raising issues 
concerning French community values, religion and religious practice, freedom of 
religious expression, freedom of choice, principle of gender equality, and human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. Projected through the lenses of current French 
and Western public discourse, and interpreted in their socio-political and cultural 
contexts, they acquire further meaning. Thus, contrary to the celebratory ‘femi-
nist’ tenor, the award was also understood as targeting specifically persons of 
Islamic faith and Islam37 rather than addressing women rights. Consequently, at 
32 Loi n° 2004–228 2004, supra note 14.
33 Conseil d’État 2008, supra note 2 (author’s literal translation).
34 ‘Burqa Le Conseil d’État et les femmes’, Actualités du droit, 11 July 2008, <Actualités du droit.htm>, 
29 April 2009.
35 Cyriel Martin, ‘Voile et burqa, même combat pour Fadela Amara’, Le Point, 16 Juillet 2008, <Le 
Point.fr.>, 29 April 2009.
36 ‘Port (Bearing) . . .’, supra note 1.
37 Anciberro, supra note 4; François de Lacoste Lareymondie, ‘La burka at l’ordre publique’, Decryptage, 
Fondation de service politique, 18 Juillet 2008, <www.libertepolitique.com>, 4 April 2009.
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the backdrop of the immigration related tensions, the Burqa Decision itself has 
become a veil hiding rather than uncovering the core of the controversy. 
Intrinsically, the Burqa question is about the notion of hierarchy of principles 
of justice governing the basic structure of society when faced with competing 
moral and religious convictions of society’s citizens, a choice between right and 
good.38 To address this challenge, the tribunal would have required legislation 
instructing it as to the French national conceptualization of ‘good’ and the ‘asso-
ciated rights’, a law unequivocally applicable to the changing demographical, 
social, cultural, political, and religious circumstances in France. In the absence of 
such law, the tribunal was left with the uncomfortable choice of deferring judg-
ment and calling upon the legislature to ﬁll the gap, or interpreting the extant law 
and making the best out of an impossible situation. The tribunal opted for the 
second alternative, likely following two misled assumptions. First is the ‘rights’ 
assumption common to liberals and communitarians, avoiding passing judgment 
on the content of the goals of the rights in question.39 This arises clearly from 
the award. 
Second is the assumption of considering the rights as being equal, belonging 
on the same ontological level. Accordingly, gender equality has a uniform mean-
ing implying a unitary set of consequences. However, while gender equity laws 
now exist in developed countries and internationally, compliance and implemen-
tation remain outstanding. And furthermore, ‘feminism’ is not monolithic as 
various feminist streams40 have been competing for intellectual and activist lead-
ership. A consequence of this ‘potpourri’ is the ‘paradox dilemma’. Because many 
women rights are deﬁned by women’s subordination, when conceptualising 
women’s identity, a tendency to overlook other possible conditions emerged. 
Consequently, appreciating women’s identity runs the risk of being trapped in the 
absurdity of perpetuation.41 Undoubtedly, this reﬂects precisely the other chal-
lenge the tribunal was facing. 
I now turn to discuss the following questions: Is the award concerned with 
gender issues? With equality? Religious faith and freedom of religious expression? 
Freedom of choice? Human rights and fundamental freedoms?42 
38 Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998).
39 Ibid.
40 A very rough sketch comprises of liberal, Marxist and dependency, and inter-sectional feminist 
theories, which correlate with the evolutionary path of feminist theory and its branching out into various 
streams. For an excellent review, see Celestine I. Nyamu, ‘How Should Human Rights and Development 
Respond to Cultural Legitimization of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?’, 41(2) Harvard 
International Law Journal (2000), p. 382. For feminist literature concerning religion and gender, see 
Tom Lewis, ‘What Not to Wear: Religious Rights, the European Court, and the Margin of Appreciation’, 
56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007), p. 395.
41 Wendy Brown, ‘Suﬀering the Paradoxes of Rights’, in Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds.), Left 
Legalism / Left Critique (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2002), p. 420.
42 It is however reasonable to presume that French community values are compatible with the values 
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A. Equality: The Award and Gender Issues 
‘Liberty, equality, fraternity’, the slogan of the 1789 French Revolution, is a 
French national maxim. The Burqa Decision focuses on equality, speciﬁcally gen-
der equality. Practising the Islamic strict Salaﬁst43 interpretation was deemed 
incompatible with gender equality, a failure to assimilate. 
To be sure, the French practice concerning gender equality remains still want-
ing. Since enfranchisement in 1944, French women have continued to enjoy only 
limited access to representative political participation.44 This might explain the 
favourable public acceptance of the Burqa Decision. Concurrently, however, one 
might question whether the protection of gender equality is served by excluding 
women of a certain faith from French naturalisation. Wouldn’t tackling the man-
ifestations of gender inequality as applicable universally to any woman be more 
conducive to gender equality? 
The (perceived or real) distinction between women of diﬀerent cultures—of 
juxtaposing Western with non-Western, and ‘white’ with ‘non-white’, women—
features as a normative dilemma in feminism.45 The Burqa Decision is a concrete 
example in which the unsettled dilemma renders the award incoherent. If practis-
ing Salaﬁsm conﬂicts with French values, then the conﬂict would apply not only 
to foreigners but also to French citizens. What would the legal implications be 
with regard to French women observing Salaﬁsm? In M’s case, what message did 
the tribunal send to any daughter born to M in France (hence citizen)? From this 
perspective, the award is discriminating between women based on their religion; 
it does not contribute to the safeguarding of gender equality per se, nor does it 
empower French women of Salaﬁst faith. 
Liberal feminism originated in the diﬀerent treatment of women and men and 
has served as the common denominator linking all subsequent feminist approaches 
and theories. Accordingly, Salaﬁsm as the award’s only source of conﬂict with 
and principles mentioned above, which form part of contemporary Western and universal values. After 
all, the French Revolution was their major articulator and promoter. 
43 A section of the Burqa Report is devoted to the description of the Salaﬁst movements in Islam, deriv-
ing from the teachings of the Sunni Muslim legal school of known hanbali which originated from the 
teachings of Ahmed Ben Hanbal. It preaches a literalist and purist reading and practise of Islam, namely 
a ‘salaﬁ ’ interpretation which means the truthful and the pure. Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassa al 
Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood political movement represents the ﬁrst organisation to espouse the salaﬁ 
teaching. It also represents an anti-European colonial expression, challenging what its adherents consider 
to be a moral decadent European inﬂuence. This inﬂuence can be countered only through Islamic revival 
and puriﬁcation and rebirth, following the historic model of the Seventh Century Islamic Caliphate. In 
this pursuit, the various groups practising Salaﬁsm operate independently but share a missionary zeal 
wherein the veil (Burqa or niqab) is designed to separate the Muslim community from the rest of society. 
(Burqa Report, 52–67)
44 Joan Wallach Scott, ‘The Politics of the Veil’, Conversations with History, 2009. Institute for 
Advanced Studies, UC Berkley, online (9 March) at: http//www.youtube.com/watch?v=MrknwN18184. 
Accessed: 2 May 2009.
45 Susan Moller Okin, ‘Feminism, Women’s Human Rights, and Cultural Diﬀerences’, 13(2) Hypatia 
(1998), p. 32.
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French values must apply to women as well as to men, all persons enjoying legal 
equality. Absurdly however, the Burqa Decision leaves M’s husband, a Frenchman 
practising Salaﬁsm, legally shielded in the religious practice the ruling deems 
radical and antagonistic to gender equality. Indeed, in a prior appellate decision, 
the same tribunal reversed a negative naturalisation award in the case of a Tuni-
sian man married to a French woman, both observing a strict stream of Islam.46 
Over time, sensitivity to real conditions in diﬀerent cultures resulted in a plu-
ralist feminism providing for various understandings of patriarchy and subordi-
nation. The Burqa Decision reﬂects this developmental stress: Had patriarchy and 
submission ﬁgured as the key concern, then the marital relationship in M’s fam-
ily, not M’s religious practice alone, would have been examined in further depth 
and compared with the corresponding French culture. Had the tribunal been 
cognizant of this pluralism it might have served gender equality by refraining 
from addressing religious practice, or alternatively, instructing both husband and 
wife to cease the practice (an impossible option under the circumstances). 
B. Freedom 
Freedom, the other value in the French Revolution’s motto, is literally absent 
from the Burqa Decision. However, since it was raised in the evidence ﬁled with 
the court, the award’s silence speaks volumes to the interpretation of freedom—
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of choice. 
Three freedoms, so cherished in the liberal and democratic State, represent the 
political choice of a Europe ravaged by religious wars. To balance the these free-
doms and contain the threat of religion, the freedoms were allocated to two 
domains: Religious freedom came under the purview of the Church and the pri-
vate sphere; freedom of choice and freedom of expression—subordinate to the 
public realm, the preserve of the State. In France, this separation is reﬂected in the 
republican idea of laïcité. However, neither political secular formula nor unique-
ness of laïcité, have guaranteed an easy ‘compartmentalisation’.47 To be sure, free-
dom of religion represents a particular type of freedom of thought and expression. 
Religious faith may be known only to the practising person; communicated to 
others in the private realm; or manifested in public. This tripartite quality of reli-
gion underlies the diﬃculty in reconciling one’s practice of faith with freedom of 
choice and expression for religion is both private and concurrently intrinsically 
public, connecting the individual with a living community. Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights48 settles the dilemma by subjecting the right of 
religious freedom to legal democratic provisions in the interest of the public: 
46 ‘Burqa Le Conseil d’État et les femmes’, Actualités du droit, 11 July 2008, <Actualités du droit.htm>, 
29 April 2009.
47 Dawn Lyon and Debora Spini, ‘Unveiling the Headscarf Debate’, 12 Feminist Legal Studies (2004), 
pp. 335–336.
48 Supra note 28.
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Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.49 
This liberal approach invokes respect for the religious person and personal dignity 
as associated with the capacity to choose, not respect for any religion and its 
content.50 
The Conseil d’État maintained a similar view as the award’s explicit reference 
to Article 9 suggests. Notably, the tribunal followed the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings concerning the Muslim veil.51 Avoiding the 
question of “why religious freedom is valued in the ﬁrst place”,52 and exploring 
“[t]he philosophical underpinnings”53 of religious freedom, it instead chose to 
focus on the secondary issue of religious practice. Compared, for example, with 
judgments on freedom of political expression or private consensual sexual 
conduct,54 this pattern in both ECtHR jurisprudence and Burqa Decision con-
veys a sense of legal uncertainty. 
1. The Award, Religion, and Freedom of Religious Expression 
By declaring M’s radical religious practice as the key ‘deﬁciency’, the tribunal 
turned directly to the issue of freedom of religious expression, skipping consider-
ation of the place of religion in society or in relation to immigration. Although 
the French republican and secular judge is authorised to determine the conﬁnes 
of religion and set limits to religious practise,55 how a tribunal determines the 
threshold beyond which a practice transcends acceptable limits and turns radical, 
is certainly material. This question remains unanswered in the Burqa Decision.
Two facts in the government’s submission to the tribunal proved critical: 
(a) The visible factor: M’s religious dress code interpreted as the external manifes-
tation of (b) her total and undisputed submission to the men in her family.56 
M was also found ignorant of her civil rights.57 In France, these elements epitomise 
cultural conduct typical of an unequal gender relationship.58 Because the tribunal 
kept silent on the case’s factual details, it is possible to only speculate that the 
award was intended to uphold the private—public divide, thus reaﬃrm the 
supremacy of the French republican and secular ethos. Consequently, but for 
being a case on immigration, the award resulted in delimiting M’s freedom of 
49 Ibid. Emphasis added.
50 Sandel, supra note 38, p. xii.
51 Lewis, supra note 40.
52 Ibid., p. 396.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.; Sandel, supra note 38.
56 De Larquier, supra note 31.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
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religious expression in spite of purporting not to have rendered judgment on 
her faith.59
Were the tribunal to engage in an intersectional analysis, a diﬀerent judicial 
outcome would not have necessarily been guaranteed. Possibly, an intersectional 
approach might have assisted the court in exploring the complexity of religion 
and gender. Engaging in an in depth subjectivity analysis of M might have lead it 
to consider whether the observance of any certain faith’s practice could be under-
stood in terms of ‘choice’, and to what extent.60 After all, M was situated in a 
particular (minority) context—an immigrant to France from a Muslim country, 
apparently comfortable in her culture, and married to a Muslim French citizen 
who was freely practising what the tribunal deemed a radical religious practice. 
Theoretically, true to French culture, and if mindful of intersectionality, the tri-
bunal might have oﬀered an interventionist award respecting M’s agency. For 
instance, M could have been given the very diﬃcult choice between education 
and government support while assimilating to French secularism as a condition 
of citizenship, or maintaining her religious practice with the consequences of 
forfeiting naturalisation. Thus, M would have been exposed to the French notion 
of gender equality, rather than being denied this opportunity. 
2. The Award and Freedom of Choice 
The 2004 prohibition of public wearing of religious insignia was designed to 
protect the public against intrusion by the private caused by the manifestation of 
one’s faith in public educational institutions. The Burqa Decision reinforces this 
legislative trend which places religious freedom and freedom of choice on the 
same ontological level. The government investigation found M’s submission to 
the men in her family and her religious practise to be wilful and independent. The 
tribunal seems to have accepted this as evidence of her personal and free choice. 
It did not query whether M’s submission represented an act of free choice or 
whether it was coerced; whether M observed her religion voluntarily yet was 
forced to submit to the men in her family; or vice versa. Considering French 
language proﬁciency as the key indicator to infer voluntary choice, but ignoring 
the possibility that unawareness of her civil rights might be attributed to condi-
tions other than language and beyond M’s control, reﬂects a selective judicial 
approach. Expanding the scope of inquiry might have disclosed whether, on the 
contrary, M lacked freedom of choice. While pursuing such adjudicative exploration 
might have necessitated further intrusion into M’s privacy (perhaps illegal) and 
proven excessive, contending with the succinct observation that in spite of her 
knowledge of French, M nevertheless adopted a radical practise of religion,61 tilted 
59 ‘Port (Bearing) . . .’, supra note 1.
60 Anastasia Vakulenko, ‘ “Islamic Headscarves” and the European Convention on Human Rights: An 
Intersectional Perspective’, 16(2) Social & Legal Studies (2007), p. 182.
61  Raoult, supra note 6.
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the award to the opposite extreme, suggesting a presumption rather than reliance 
on suﬃcient factual grounds. Therefore, appraised from an intersectional per-
spective, the award cannot be construed as protecting gender equality on the basis 
of a woman’s agency. 
Freedom of choice is antecedent to freedom of religion only where the latter 
results from an individual’s choice of religion and its practice. Accordingly, free-
dom of religion denotes a person’s liberty to maintain any faith and observe it in 
any form, at least in private. Restrictions upon that freedom are hence akin to 
those placed on other freedoms (for instance, the prohibition of homicide for 
religious rituals grounded in the supremacy of the right to life and protection 
against bodily harm, which pre-empt the right of individual freedoms). However, 
where religious faith is pursued not out of ‘rational’ choice, religious freedom is 
ontologically diﬀerent from freedom of choice. Religious observance is often “a 
constitutive end”,62 essential to the believer’s sense of good and identity. 
What makes a religious belief worthy of respect is not its mode of acquisition—be it choice, revela-
tion, persuasion, or habituation—but its place in a good life, or the qualities of character it pro-
motes, or [from a political point of view] its tendency to cultivate the habits and dispositions that 
make good citizens.63
From this perspective, freedom of choice looks quite diﬀerent from religious free-
dom. This renders the tribunal’s line of argumentation and ﬁnding of failure in 
M’s assimilation eﬀorts irrelevant. Indeed, the Conseil d’État ignored the fact that 
M owed duties she might have been unable to both choose and renounce, “even 
in the face of civil obligations that may conﬂict”.64 
3. The Award and Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The Burqa Decision should remind gender equality protagonists that the human 
rights “safety net” does have holes. Since 1948, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms have been codiﬁed in various international and regional documents.65 
In 1980, France became party also to more speciﬁc human rights treaties.66 
62 Sandel, supra note 38, p. xii.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., p. xiii.
65 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) December 10, 1948 and as 
amended, November 1, 1998, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>, 15 September 2010; ECHR, 
supra note 28; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [Rome 
4.XI.1950] as amended by Protocol No. 11 with Protocol Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13, Registry of the 
European Court of Human Rights September 2003, <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-
dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf>, 16 September 2010. 
66 Oﬃce of the United nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, GAOR Res. 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, <http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/law/ccpr.htm>, 1 April 2011; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
ibid. and; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ibid. 
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A signatory to the ECHR,67 France is bound especially by four articles relevant 
to the Burqa Decision: Article 8—Right to respect for private and family life, 
Article 9—Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10—Freedom of 
expression, and Article 14—Prohibition of discrimination. Except for Article 14, 
a party’s duty to protect these rights depends on its national interpretation. 
The Burqa Decision refers only to Article 9. Grounding the objection to M’s 
naturalization in her inability to integrate into French society and placing the 
burden of integration solely on her; and justifying the decision as an expression 
of France’s commitment to gender equality as per Article 9, ignores the strict duty 
to non-discrimination stipulated in Article 14. This puts in question the award’s 
compliance with France’s international obligations. A brief examination of the 
award’s compatibility with the international human rights and fundamental free-
doms regime68 raises the following issues: 
(a) Universalism
The liberating eﬀect of the award is diminished when seen from the angle of the 
feminist conceptualisation of human rights and development. Notably, can there 
be a universalist approach to gender equality when women (and men) of diﬀerent 
cultural, social, and religious backgrounds are lumped together in the ontology of 
human rights? In other words, is it possible to re-conceptualise human rights 
without losing sight of women’s rights? How? To be sure, feminists, who have 
coined the well-known slogan “women’s rights are human rights”, have identiﬁed 
an array of scenarios and contexts in which the universalist presumption of a 
single comprehensive interpretation of gender relations as a human rights issue 
has run afoul. For instance, in the majority of judicial procedures similar to M’s, 
rulings were adopted by male judges and reﬂected gender bias and the marginali-
sation of women’s perspectives.69 Often, the distinction between women of 
diﬀerent cultures played a decisive role; routinely, two types of women were jux-
taposed—Western/European against the Oriental/migrant.70 Not unlike these 
cases, the Burqa Decision as well, at least implicitly, “berate[s] Muslim women 
for failing to conform to a Western image of how women should behave”.71 
This judicial tendency has been criticised for masking an imperialistic approach 
clothed in militant secularism.72 Appropriating gender equality for purposes of 
67 A member of the Council of Europe and the European Union, France may be bound in ‘ﬁrst inter-
national order’ to the European legal acquis (heritage), including the ECHR. 
68 For an interesting account and analysis of the French 2004 law and the Burqa Report and the ques-
tion of whether they accord with French international legal treaty commitments, see Saxena.
69 Lyon and Spini, supra note 47.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., p. 339.
72 I am indebted to one of the anonymous reviewers for this comment.
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justiﬁcatory human rights rhetoric73 (deliberately or ignorantly) perpetuates dis-
crimination and oppression of women albeit in alternate ways and contexts.74 
(b) Human Rights in General
The human rights discourse has been faulted for failing to identify abuse and 
disregard of women as severe human rights violations.75 Likely culprits of such 
violations are family members but also political institutions including govern-
ment. The two types of actors are inter-connected for where family members 
(men and/or women) actively engage in violating women’s human rights in the 
private realm of a woman’s home, or remain silent witnesses, an often passive 
government is failing in its duty to eﬀectively intervene in the private sphere thus 
permitting the transgression to continue.76 Where a woman is liberated in her 
home, she is more likely to participate also in the public sphere.77 By ruling “who 
rightfully belongs in the public space”,78 the Burqa Decision reinforces M’s exclu-
sion: In addition to the salaﬁst dress code designed to isolate the believer from 
main stream society, the denial of naturalisation which prevents her from enjoy-
ing citizenship rights further contributes to her banishment. To other women 
marginalised at home, the award may be sending a disappointing message. 
The promotion of women’s dignity advocated by both cultural relativists and 
intersectionalists79 has at times muddied the ‘human rights cum gender equality’ 
discourse. Other feminist thought has been criticised of concealing an imperialist 
agenda, Islamophobia, or inadvertently colluding with governments oblivious to 
women rights. “Being tough on Muslims”80 has been viewed as serving Western 
governments catering to the domestic electorate by mobilising national identity, 
while concurrently scoring points in foreign relations implicitly signalling their 
support in the War on Terror.81 This intra-feminist debate contributed to entrench-
ment of gender discrimination.82 Applying this analysis to the Burqa Decision 
suggests that had the tribunal cast the question of gender and religion in cultural 
relativist and intersectional human rights phraseology, it would have found, as it 
indeed did, that M’s agency would more suitably be accommodated in another 
country more reﬂective of her particular subjectivity. 
73 Sherene H. Razack, ‘The ‘Sharia Law Debate’ in Ontario: The Modernity/Premodernity Distinction 
in Legal Eﬀorts to Protect Women from Culture’, 15(3) Feminist Legal Studies (2007), p. 32.
74 Lyon and Spini, supra note 47, p. 339.
75 Okin, supra note 45.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Razack, supra note 73, p. 25.
79 Vakulenko, supra note 60.
80 Razack, supra note 73, p. 25.
81 Ibid.
82 Oonagh Reitman, ‘Cultural Relativist and Feminist Critiques of International Human Rights—
Friends or Foes?’ 100(1) Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift (1997), p. 100.
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(c) Human Rights Law and Development
A frequent argument in the feminist discourse notes the disjunction separating 
the human rights and development approach from the respective legal discipline.83 
Although intrinsically universal, human rights’ practical protection is entrusted 
in the hands of individual national governments. This has not been lost on the 
CEDAW84 drafters who, in an eﬀort to bolster state accountability and compli-
ance, urged states to eradicate gender discriminatory customs and practices.85 
France ratiﬁed the CEDAW in 1984, and the proponents of the Burqa Decision 
may well be contending with the legal act as proof of France’s compliance with its 
international duty to protect women and gender equality. 
(d) Human Rights as Culturally Conditioned 
Another approach to women rights as human rights has sought to supplement 
the exclusive focus on national and international human rights legislation with a 
sociological/anthropological cross-cultural dialogue.86 Deploring “the troubling 
way rights discourse not only reinforces the ﬁction of a monolithic subject but 
potentially regulates us through that monolith”,87 the cultural discourse might 
potentially eﬀect a breakthrough by advocating interaction and dialogue. Being 
less formalistic, it attempts to incorporate gender equality within human rights 
by accommodating a woman’s needs and wants as forming part of her local cul-
tural environment while safeguarding her enjoyment of beneﬁts gained from 
international and national legal achievements. The cross-cultural dialogue 
approach is in the early stages of practice by community-based groups.88 Had 
it been available to the tribunal to consider, M’s case might have been decided 
diﬀerently. 
IV. What Can We Take from the Burqa Decision? 
The Burqa Decision represents an episode symptomatic of the so-called ‘clash of 
civilization’. The contact between diﬀerent cultural groups has seen tension 
mounting and spanning across Europe and beyond.89 In this context, the  perceived 
83 Nyamu, supra note 40; Brown, supra note 41.
84 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
New York 18 December 1979, GAOR Res. 34/180, <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/cedaw/cedaw
.html>, 16 September 2010.
85 Nyamu, supra note 40.
86 Ibid.
87 Brown, supra note 41, p. 429.
88 Ibid.
89 Elaine Sciolino, ‘Britain Grapples with Role for Islamic Justice’, New York Times, 19 November 
2008; Vakulenko, supra note 60; Lieve Gies, ‘What Not to Wear: Islamic Dress and School Uniforms’, 
14 Feminist Legal Studies (2006), p. 377; Razack, supra note 73; Lewis, supra note 40; and Ed Husain, The 
Islamist (London: Penguin Books, 2007).
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threat to national identity has unfolded, among others, also in the form of strong 
anti-Muslim immigrant sentiment sweeping throughout Europe. It is against this 
backdrop that the Burqa Decision was decreed. 
Gender relations, in fact, the Woman, have once again become the paramount 
symbol articulating the social and political tension and representing one of the 
chief outlets for the pent up stress. Displayed in confrontations at schools and 
hospitals, where secular public institutions’ ‘standard operation procedures’ have 
been challenged by religious demands,90 tension had more than once escalated 
into physical violence. This became exposed in the disgruntled French banlieues,91 
in racial violence in British cities, violent attacks on foreigners in Germany, hos-
tility toward distinctly ‘ethnic foreign’ neighbourhoods in Italy, to name a few. A 
signiﬁcant threshold was crossed as the friction escalated beyond verbal dispute 
over to violent outburst, with the 2004 assassination of Dutch ﬁlm maker Theo 
van Gogh by the Dutch citizen Mohammed Fahmi Bouyeri. The same year, the 
tension produced the promulgation of the 2004 French ‘veil law’.92
It is against this backdrop that the Conseil d’État chose to strike a new ‘balance 
of rights’. Consequently, reaﬃrming secularism’s supremacy over religion came at 
the expenses of the M’s right to non-discrimination. What this is re-aﬃrming is 
that also in France, similar to other cultures and regardless of socio-political con-
text, religion, or political regime, the legal status of women ﬁgures as a pivotal 
concern, serving as a political axe to grind other—not gender related—power 
rivalries. The Burqa Decision is one example among many (and an important one 
for it is judicial hence authoritative) of struggles between social and political 
forces seeking to transform (or preserve) the balance (or imbalance) of power in 
the relationship of State and Church. Similar to past struggles, in the current 
90 In Canada, an initiative to formalise legal recognition of Sharia law in Ontario resulted in the de-
coupling of any religious adjudication from the State’s legal realm, (Mariam Pal, ‘Faith-based Arbitration 
in Canada and Beyond: Recent Developments and Future Prospects’, presented to the BCCBA ADR 
Section, Vancouver, and the Institute for Transborder Studies, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 24 and 
25 January 2006 (notes ﬁled with the author); Margaret Boyd, Dispute Resolution in Family Law: Protect-
ing Choice, Promoting Inclusion. Submitted to the Attorney General of Ontario, December 2004, <http://
www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/> , 2 May 2009; Razack, ibid.) and in Quebec, 
the struggle to come to terms with Muslim migration is being debated in the legislature as well as adjudi-
cated in an attempt to deﬁne the scope of ‘reasonable accommodation’ (Graeme Hamilton, ‘Unveil, 
Quebec says’, National Post , 25 March 2010; Marian Scott, “Niqab heats up rights controversy row over 
veil; Woman refused to uncover face in French class”, The Gazette, 3 March 2010).
91 Noemi Gal-Or and Bernhard Kiotus, ‘Urban Justice and Sustainability’, presented at Conference on 
the Sociology of Urban and Regional Development, University of British Columbia, 22–25 August 2007, 
Vancouver, BC, Canada, August 2007 (ﬁled with author).
92 This inter-faith stress surpasses Christians versus Muslims tension and is running within Christian 
communities as well, for instance, within particular Christian communities in Canada, concerning polyg-
amy. Susan Drummond, ‘A Marriage of Fear and Xenophobia. Our Criminalization of Polygamy Isn’t 
about Protecting Women’, Globe and Mail, 6 April 2009; Petti Fong, ‘ “Bountiful” Sect Leaders Charged 
with Polygamy’, Toronto Star, 8 January 2009 <http://www.thestar.com/article/563546>, 8 January 
2009), and in similar situations in Utah, Idaho and Arizona in the United States.
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round as well, women have continued to furnish the conspicuous bone of conten-
tion.
Consequently, court decisions addressing gender issues must not be taken at 
face value. As submitted here, the Burqa Decision is not primarily about empow-
ering women and securing gender equality. It is ﬁrst about competing worldviews 
and political institutional, ideological, cultural, and religious power contests. 
Only in second place is the award concerned with promoting or preserving the 
legal status of women as embedded in those worldviews. Thus, if women are 
being empowered, it is generally as a by-product, and where they are so, the sup-
port beneﬁts only certain women and not others. Furthermore, and at the same 
time, the Burqa Decision suggests that even where the road to gender equality is 
paved with good intentions, the opposite result might ensue: Women may still be 
patronised due to myopia in distinguishing freedom of choice from freedom of 
conscience. 
V. Conclusion
As this article is being written, the French government ﬁnds itself in the midst of 
a collective soul searching enterprise designed to tackle the ‘Burqa’ issue. In prep-
aration for the 11th of April, 2011, the date of entry into force of the Burqa ban, 
the government has been distributing some 100,000 handbills and 400,000 pam-
phlets to reminder the population of the ban.93 Posters in public places have been 
announcing the “Republic’s seeing itself with an uncovered face” (“La République 
se vit à visage découvert”),94 a message reinforced on a government website entitled 
identically and with a similar URL,95 which provides also a Q&A section. Law 
enforcement authorities have been instructed to administer the law by summon-
ing veil-wearers to the police station to ask them, out of the public eye, to remove 
the veil for identiﬁcation purposes, and required them to keep it oﬀ. Should the 
wearer refuse to comply, a ﬁne of up to 150 EURs will be charged.96 At the same 
time, as part of his 2012 election campaign, President Sarkozy has been putting 
special emphasis on the role of Islam in a secular society.97 And less than ﬁve 
months before the entry into force of the Burqa law, two judicial decisions—one 
93 Bruce Crumley, ‘New Info Campaign Tells French Citizens How to Be Burqa Vigilantes’, Global-
Spin, 3 March 2011, <http://globalspin.blogs.time.com/2011/03/03/new-info-campaign-tells-french-
citizens-how-to-be-burqa-vigilantes/>, 30 March, 2011. 
94 ‘Ce que dit la loi sur l’interdiction du port du voile intégral’, L’Express.fr, 3 March 2011, <http://
www.lexpress.fr/actualite/societe/ce-que-dit-la-loi-sur-l-interdiction-du-port-du-voile-integral_968254
.html>, 30 March 2011.
95 http://www.visage-decouvert.gouv.fr/index.html.
96 ‘Ban on Wearing Face Veils to Come into Eﬀect April’, France 24, 3 March 2011, <http://www
.france24.com/en/20110303-ban-wearing-full-islamic-veils-enforced-april-burqa-niqab-france-law>, 
30 March 2011.
97 Ibid.
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in a labour dispute concerning a nursery teacher who refused to remove her full 
veil while at work, the other dealing with a fully veiled person while driving—
have ruled against the petitioners.98 To be sure, this is the tip of the iceberg in 
France’s search for ways to sustain its laïcité, its national identity, and protect itself 
against real or perceived threats. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that France 
will not feature as the only scene where the repercussion of its Burqa ban will be 
played out. If experience oﬀers any indication, the law’s enforcement stands to be 
challenged at the ECtHR.
This article has shown that the real primary dilemma underlying the Burqa 
Decision consists in the re-conceptualisation of the separation of State and 
Church ‘à la French’. Sandel’s insights provide some guidance; his objections to 
“liberalism conceived as a political conception of justice”99 are instructive about 
the pitfalls inherent in this pursuit. 
Here is what the debate should address if it is to avoid the scandalous and 
the “abstract and decorous”,100 and elicit what is essential and moral for the 
French, and for that matter, liberal democratic society. It requires (a) to strike 
a choice concerning which of the contending moral or religious doctrines is 
true, (b) to acknowledge that while political liberalism endorses pluralism as a 
foundation of its structure of justice, morality and religion are not pluralistic, and 
(c) to consider that the political liberal ideal of public reason excludes moral and 
religious idealism and is thus unduly restricting and impoverishing the political 
discourse.101 
The other issue prompted by the Burqa Decision—on its face its primary con-
cern, but as argued here, in fact, only of secondary importance—is gender equal-
ity. Not only is the Burqa Decision concealing a larger and more profound cultural 
(and racial and religious) tension; not only is it ambivalent with regards to wom-
en’s rights; but through the discourse within which it has been couched, and 
which it has subsequently elicited, it has served also to amplify the tensions within 
the feminist discourse. To be sure, the award remains just as ambivalent when 
addressed from the various feminist theoretical perspectives. 
This article set out to critically study the empowerment of women’s legal status 
via the jurisprudential route, and in course of the research found it to be caught 
in a theoretical paradox.102 The conundrum of ‘freedom of choice versus religious 
freedom, cum human rights, gender equality paradox’ in the feminist discourse 
requires compromise. Feminist thought, which has always been intertwined with 
 98 Joseph Bamat, ‘Islamic Veil Trials Illustrate Challenges of Upcoming Ban’, France 24, 14 Decem-
ber 2010, <http://www.france24.com/en/20101214-burqa-ban-france-islamic-veil-trials-nantes-mantes-
muslims-rulings-society-islam>, 30 March 2011. 
 99 Sandel, supra note 38, p. 196.
 100 Ibid., p. 216.
101 Ibid.
102 Brown, supra note 41.
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feminist activism, faces the option of either negotiate, strategise, and adhere to a 
provisional ‘main stream’ feminist approach until such time when the conditions 
ripen for a change of course, or risk struggling with the uncontrolled conse-
quences ﬂowing from the perpetuation of the paradox. 
In conclusion, placed within the larger Western context of the headscarf debate, 
the Burqa Decision accomplished the following feats: While encouraging secular 
women, it also stated the obvious—that gender equality masks the political strug-
gle between secularism and religion, nationalism and immigration. While serving 
a most powerful tool, gender equality does not necessarily ﬁgure as the ultimate 
goal. In such context, relaxing the tension and doing justice to gender equality is 
a matter for any country’s public debate and its legislature, not the court. 

